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Defining ‘nudging’
We need to begin with a working definition of ‘nudging’. For the purposes of this discussion,
I suggest, mostly following Luc Bovens, that an intervention constitutes a ‘nudge’ if it meets
certain criteria: first, that it must not restrict choice – no options must be forbidden;
second, that it must be in the interests of the person being nudged; third, that it involves a
change in the architecture or environment in which the choice of the person being nudged
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is made; and, fourth, that it engages with the psychological insight that individuals may not,
on occasion, act as wholly rational beings and therefore that public policy should take into
account that individual decisions are made that result from ‘less than fully deliberative
choice.’[1] We can add to this a fifth criterion: that the intervention does not significantly
change the economic or other incentives of the person being nudged.
Introducing human dignity into the nudging debate
Debates about the ethics of nudging defined in this way seem paradoxical. Both supporters
and opponents invoke the concept of ‘human dignity’ in support of their respective
positions.[2] Given that the concept of human dignity is a foundation of international and
European human rights, as well as for many systems of national constitutional rights, and
that human dignity is extensively resorted to in contemporary political discourse,
disagreement over nudging’s conformity with human dignity is critical.[3] In this brief
discussion, my principal focus is on Cass Sunstein’s Why Nudge?: The Politics of Libertarian
Paternalism.[4] This presents a proposal for nudging as an alternative to traditional
regulatory mandates and economic incentive-based regulation. I shall suggest that nudging
creates considerable tensions with thick conceptions of human dignity.
Sunstein’s human dignity
Sunstein adopts a somewhat confusing position regarding the relationship between human
dignity and nudging. His baseline position is that nudging is not incompatible with human
dignity,[5] but he also goes further seeing nudging as supporting the idea of human
dignity.[6] His understanding of human dignity is also complex, not to say confusing. He
adopts, at various points, at least three different substantive concepts of human dignity.
The first understands human dignity essentially as involving respecting human agency and
furthering autonomous decision-making (dignity-as-autonomy).[7] The second understands
human dignity as requiring respect for others in the sense that others should not be treated
in such as way as to insult or demean them (dignity-as-non-humiliation).[8] The third
understands human dignity as treating persons as ends rather than simply as means
(object formula).[9] Each of these formulations, of course, has advocates who distinguish
their favoured approach as fundamentally different from the other.[10] For Sunstein,
however, they are all adopted, at the same time, without any apparent recognition that they
constitute different (and potentially conflicting) understandings of human dignity.
The reason for this apparent conceptual slackness subsequently becomes apparent,
because ultimately he regards human dignity (in whatever of these guises it is presented)
as merely a ‘rhetorical flourish,’[11] a way of appealing to emotion. [12] Whatever rational
substance it has amounts simply to advocating human welfare,[13] and thus presumably is
subject to trade offs with other aspects of welfare.[14] For Sunstein, die Würde des
Menschen ist antastbar. Reducing dignity to welfare is an important move in Sunstein’s
advocacy of nudging. In reducing human dignity to human welfare, he is back to the sphere
of cost-benefit analysis with which he ultimately appears a lot more comfortable;[15] but
achieving this leaves in its wake an impoverished understanding of human dignity.[16]
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Cultivating inauthentic virtues
In the context of nudging, it completely misses why someone would want to be able to
choose to do good (e.g. give blood, or donate organs after death) for the right reasons as
understood by that individual and others, rather than be nudged into choosing to do it for the
government’s reasons.[17] The British Government’s Organ Donation Taskforce, which
considered the potential impact of an opt-out system for organ donation in the UK, in
recommending against such a system, drew attention to the ‘powerful evidence’ it had
received from recipients of organs ‘who stressed their need to know that organs had been
freely given by donors and their families, and from donor families who often find great
comfort in being an active part of the decision to donate.’[18] It entails, in other words, ‘the
cultivation of inauthentic virtues,’ in Karen Yeung’s pithy phrase.[19]
Harnessing cognitive irrationalities
There are two basis forms of nudging, and my concerns so far relate to particularly to one
of these forms. I suggested earlier that nudging engages with the psychological insight that
individuals may not, on occasion, act as wholly rational beings and therefore that public
policy should take into account the fact that individual decisions are sometimes made that
result from ‘less than fully deliberative choice.’ But this engagement may take either of two
radically different paths. Nudging that encourages more discussion, more debate, more
rational discourse, and more participation in the political system does not, I think, raise the
specific dignity concerns I raised in the previous paragraph. On the other hand, some forms
of nudging rely on psychological insights to try to ensure ‘good’ results in ways that depend
on less than full transparency. They ‘attempt to harness cognitive irrationalities in aid of
desired social policy outcomes.’[20]
Political economy of nudging
We should note three further aspects of Sunstein’s approach before considering the
implications of thicker conceptions of human dignity for both forms of nudging more
generally. Despite its subtitle (‘The Politics of Libertarian Paternalism’), there is practically
no discussion of the current political economy of nudging. Yet, it is no coincidence that the
four governments that have shown most interest in nudging are all Conservative center-
right governments (the Obama administration in the United States,[21] David Cameron’s
Coalition government in Britain,[22] Angela Merkel’s government in Germany, [23] and the
current government of New South Wales in Australia[24]). The reason to note this is
because it situates the current practice of nudging centrally within economic liberalism and
deregulation.[25]
Whether this is Sunstein’s own political agenda is unclear, but I suspect it is. He argues
consistently, for example, that nudging, rather than traditional regulation, should be the
default approach, and that traditional regulation can only be justified if supported by much
stronger evidence than that presented in favour of nudging itself. His is not just a collection
of good ideas without a theory, it seems, but a general theory of regulation. But in
Sunstein’s case, as well as in the case of each of the four governments with whom nudging
is most popular, it is an economic liberalism that still wants to achieve some betterment of
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the human condition, provided it is without significant political or economic costs. We
should expect, therefore, that methods of nudging are more likely to be adopted that aim to
achieve results manipulatively rather than transparently, and that they will be under the
radar politically, in spite of Sunstein’s rather optimistic view that nudging is consistent with
openness.[26] This is because, as we have seen, at least some of the types of nudges
advocated depend on the use of choice architecture that ‘is intended to work deliberately …
to by-pass the individual’s rational decision-making processes in order to channel behavior
in the direction preferred by choice architect.’[27] It takes advantage ‘of the human
tendency to act unreflectively.’[28]
Citizens as consumers
Indeed, there is a tone of barely disguised skepticism of, and frustration with, democratic
decision-making in the book.[29] This is particularly noteworthy in the way in which those
benefitting from regulation are described. Rather than being ‘citizens’, a description that
emphasizes their political status and their active participation in choosing and controlling
those they elect, they are primarily regarded as ‘consumers,’[30] emphasizing their role as
market actors (and somewhat passive ones at that).[31] Thus, one of the principal
arguments in support of a non-paternalistic justification for regulation, that we as citizens
impose constraints on ourselves through electing officials who will regulate in our
collective interests, is simply set to one side.[32] It would also be unsurprising if an
approach to nudging were taken that emphasized technocratic, as opposed to democratic,
legitimacy, given that the latter is so much more open than the former to the ‘emotions’ of
which Sunstein is so suspicious.[33]
Framing the issue as paternalism
A second aspect of Sunstein’s book is also more understandable if we understand the
specifically American political economy of nudging. This is the extent to which, in his quest
to defend nudging against accusations of strong paternalism, he cedes significant ground
to the libertarian right wing, particularly its American variant.[34] It is this group, often
associated with and funded by corporate business interests, which essentially frames the
issues that Sunstein discusses, with somewhat bizarre results, at least to my European
eyes. Thus, Sunstein sees much traditional regulation as problematic because it is
analyzed as strongly paternalistic, particularly in limiting the freedom of choice of
consumers for their own good.
Where did all the producers go?
There are at least two significant problems with this way of framing the issues. First,
traditional regulation is usually based, rather, on preventing harms resulting from
producers. Regulation that is targeted by government at commercial organizations can
hardly be regarded as raising any concerns about paternalism.[35] In Sunstein’s view of the
world, however, producers sometimes simply drop out of the picture, and with them the
harm that they can cause, leaving only the ostensibly paternalistic relationship between
government and consumer to be worried over.[36] In prominent examples, Sunstein largely
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sets to one side the triangular relationship of government, producer and consumer. [37] For
example, rather than seeing banning the sale of fructose-saturated, obesity-inducing
soda[38] in huge sixteen-ounce containers as restricting the harms caused by soda
manufacturers, the issue is reframed as one of government paternalism towards soda
consumers.[39] In none of the list of fourteen regulatory possibilities he considers in
getting people to stop smoking, is there any mention of the option that the manufacture of
cigarettes might simply be banned because of the harm they cause. By allowing producers
to escape scrutiny, Government is let off the hook of having to satisfy what is surely one of
its principal tasks in securing human dignity: to provide the conditions for individuals to be
able to exercise free choices, by regulating harms caused by powerful interests.
Self-regarding and other-regarding decisions
The second problem, as several commentators have pointed out in relation to Sunstein’s
earlier book with Richard Thaler,[40] is that much regulation is not primarily concerned with
affecting individuals actions for their own good, sometimes called ‘self-regarding’
decisions, but rather for the good of others, sometimes called ‘other-regarding’
decisions.[41] When guns are regulated or prohibited, this is primarily to protect others
rather than the individual who seeks to own weapons. When cigarettes are taxed in order to
reduce smoking, this is often to reduce the costs to national health services, rather than for
the benefit of the individual smoker. To view these types of regulation through the lens of
paternalism, as if they were aiming to target ‘self-regarding’ decisions by individuals, just
seems misguided, as well as to have implicitly accepted the libertarian right-wing framing
of these issues.
Regulation for disillusioned American progressives
This is not to say that Sunstein doesn’t understand these points; of course, he does. My
fear is that the progressive in Sunstein has become so disillusioned by the inability of
progressive liberals to retain, let alone advance, basic aspects of American progressive
politics that he sees nudging as simply the best way of achieving aspects of this agenda,
given the current rather bleak circumstances. Why Nudge? reads to me, in other words, as
an admission of defeat, an analysis driven by despair: the only way of furthering a
progressive liberal agenda in the current context of American politics is through
manipulation and under-the-radar activity, because progressive politics stands no chance
of success if it above-board. And, in the American context, that analysis may well,
unfortunately, be correct. But if that is what is driving Sunstein, it would be much more
honest to come out and say this directly, rather than to dress it up in language that implies
that it is not situated in a particularly American political moment.
Those of us with a less bleak view of the possibilities of democratic politics in our own
countries should be anxious to resist the import of such a method of regulation so imbued
with particularistic American values and context. That may, of course, be optimistic.
Perhaps we in Europe are now in a situation where, as a result of economic globalization,
we must accept that we too are unable to regulate multi-nationals and other powerful
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interests, and that we are reduced to having to view the world through disillusioned
American liberal eyes. But we should not simply assume this, and we certainly should not
structure our entire regulatory system around this assumption.
Ignoring the evidence
The third worrying aspect of the book relates to the use of empirical evidence. Sunstein is
apparently committed to evidence-based policy-making. At several points in the book, he
stresses the need to test criticisms of nudging against empirical results of nudging in
practice.[42] Sunstein’s book, however, is remarkable unempirical, not just because he
doesn’t appear to do empirical work himself but more importantly because he underreports
available evidence against nudging. Why is this so? Essentially, my reading of his book is
that he is attempting to present a theoretical defence of nudging, rebutting claims that
nudging is paternalistic. He stresses that, in practice, judging whether nudging is a good
thing in any particular situation depends on context and evidence; in some cases, it may be
inappropriate, but that should not lead us to any conclusion about its theoretical
justification. I disagree. A practice-dependent analysis of nudging is not only appropriate; it
is also necessary.
Effects of nudging-as-regulatory-theory in Britain
What, then, does the evidence base tell us about nudging? A detailed investigation was
carried out by the Science and Technology Select Committee of the upper House of the
United Kingdom Parliament (the House of Lords) in 2010 and 2011.[43] This Report makes
sobering reading for those contemplating introducing nudging as a central element in
government regulation. Given the features of Sunstein’s work noted above, it is not
surprising that evidence from this Report in the United Kingdom indicates that, as
practiced, nudging undermines a thicker conception of human dignity in at least two ways:
first, by diverting government from its responsibility to use other, more effective,
instruments that would secure the just redistribution of resources essential to us being
able to exercise our human agency;[44] and, second, by reducing opportunities for public
deliberation and democratic discourse in favour of non-transparent, technocratic
manipulation.[45] And we have already seen that other evidence from the UK supports a
conclusion that certain types of nudging strategies in practice restrict the opportunities for
citizens to act as moral agents, which involves us in doing the right thing for what we
consider the right reason.[46]
Unjustified optimism
These criticisms should not be seen as an attack on behavioural economics. Its benefits as
a tool of analysis are clear in at least one respect. Sunstein points to the insight that
proponents of policies are apt to be wildly optimistic about the benefits of policies they
support, and significantly downplay the likely problems.[47] This insight is all too evident in
Sunstein’s own work on nudging. The absence of any reference to the British empirical
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evidence against nudging betrays is noteworthy.[48] As Jeremy Waldron wrote in his sober
New York Review of Books review of Why Nudge?: ‘More reassuring, I think, would be a
candid assessment of what might go wrong with nudging.’[49]
Human dignity revisited
But there is a deeper problem, as Waldron also suggests. Critics of nudging are right to
challenge Sunstein’s thin and reductionist understanding of human dignity.[50] If it is to be
used, we should espouse a thicker understanding, adopting a more complex conception of
the person and of the role of government in furthering the common good. In those
jurisdictions that incorporate this thicker conception of human dignity, nudging may also
encounter legal difficulties.[51] Constitutional and human rights legalities aside, however,
those seeking to pursue progressive politics should reject nudging in favour of regulation
that is more transparent, more effective, more democratic, and allows us more fully to act
as moral agents.
I am grateful to Bruce Ackerman, Christoph Möllers, Susan Rose-Ackerman, and Caroline
Pannell for several conversations on these issues.
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